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       Creative Economy and Development in the Global South 
ifa Input 02/2019 
 
Justin O‘Connor 
This paper sets out to challenge the dominant narrative of the creative economy as a new option for 
developing countries. The much-vaunted growth rates proclaimed by UNCTAD’s Creative Economy 
Programme have slowed, and are seen to apply to a particular kind of manufactured good, as well as 
being overwhelmingly dominated by Asia, and especially China. This paper tries to unpick the domi-
nant creative economy model of entrepreneurship, creative human capital and open market oppor-
tunity and suggests that – other than in East Asia – it is business as usual for the Global North. The 
creative economy not only fails to deliver its promise of development but has profound consequences 
for local cultures, caught up in an ever more global web of exploitation driven by the new digital plat-
forms. We need to return to the earlier concerns of ‘culture and development’ now fully aware of the 
downsides, as well as the potential, of cultural economies in an uncertain global landscape.  
 
Leapfrogging Development? 
 
In 2016 The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) relaunched its 
Creative Economy Programme (CEP). Originally 
set up in 2004, the programme published two 
highly influential statistical reports on the global 
trade in cultural goods and services in 2008 and 
2010. UNCTAD’s revived programme re-asserts 
the claim that ‘the creative industries are among 
the most dynamic sectors in the world economy’ 
and sets out to make good its promise that they 
provide ‘new opportunities for developing coun-
tries to leapfrog into emerging high-growth areas 
of the world economy’1.  
 
                                                 
1 https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CreativeEconomy/Creative-
Economy-Programme.aspx 
2008 Report: https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.-
aspx?publicationid=945 
2010 Report: https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.-
aspx?publicationid=946 
Most Recent report 2019: https://unctad.org/en/Publications-
Library/ditcted2018d3_en.pdf.  
While European countries and the European 
Union itself began to adopt the creative indus-
tries’ terminology from around 2006, 2 East Asian 
countries – Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
mainland China eagerly seized on the idea in the 
mid-naughties. This has continued, with South 
Korea and India, focusing very much on Bolly-
wood. Indonesia launched its ‘creative economy’ 
agency BEKRAF in 2015, and Malaysia launched 
CENDANA (Cultural Economy Development 
Agency) in 2017.  
 
In Brazil former President Dilma Rousseff 
moved away from Gilberto Gil’s Cultura Viva in 
2015 and adopted the idea of the creative econo-
my. This echoed the work of two influential 
staffers at the Inter-American Development 
Bank, who branded it (for no obvious reason) 
‘the Orange Economy’3. One of these, Iván Du-
                                                 
2 Cf. https://cultureactioneurope.org/knowledge/creatives-
industries/1-the-economy-of-culture-in-europe/.  
3 https://publications.iadb.org/en/orange-economy-infinite-
opportunity. 
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que, is now president of Columbia and sees this 
as a new direction for a Latin America deemed to 
have broken with its erstwhile state centred Left-
ism. Across Africa the creative industries have 
had less traction as a national policy idea, but the 
promotion of creative entrepreneurship, central 
to the creative economy agenda, has been driven 
by programmes of the British Council and latter-
ly, those of the Goethe-Institut. The British Coun-
cil has programmes across the globe, promoting 
mapping methodologies and creative hubs, and 
establishing creative entrepreneurship as a key 
dimension of any creative economy strategy4.  
 
UNCTAD’s reports made a robust statistical 
case for the rise and rise of the creative economy 
in the Global South. This economy was not only a 
developed world post-industrial replacement 
sector but a part of a truly epochal shift across 
the globe. The reports now read as a Wunder-
kammer of turn-of-the-millennium thinking on 
culture, creativity, economy, innovation, entre-
preneurship, cities, hubs, sustainability; a kalei-
doscopic assemblage of definitions, charts, tables 
and Venn diagrams. It was the headline narrative 
that stood out. We were entering a new global 
era in which ideas and creativity were now the 
new productive forces, requiring not minerals or 
giant industrial plant but human talent. The crea-
tive economy dealt with intangible products, the 
ultimate renewable resource that would never be 
depleted. This new era saw WTO facilitated 
global trade increasing in leaps and bounds, and 
nowhere as fast as in the trade in cultural goods 
and services. These were growing globally at 
around 14 percent year on year and 13.5 percent 
in Developing Countries. By 2011 the Global 
South accounted for almost half of all global 
trade in cultural goods. Given this rapid increase 
there seemed little doubt that they would over-
                                                 
4 https://creativeconomy.britishcouncil.org  
On the Goethe-Institut see: https://cultural-entrepreneurship.org.  
take the Global North in a few years – which they 
did in 20155. 
 
Whilst UNCTAD was rolling out its CEP, 
UNESCO was busy framing and ratifying its 
latest Convention on the Protection and Promo-
tion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
(CDCE), a process not complete until 2009. The 
coalition assembled around the CDCE had a 
more ambivalent, even sceptical view of the crea-
tive industries/economy. The CDCE came out of 
debates around culture and development linked 
to the anti-colonial, self-determination move-
ments of the 1960s and 1970s. Development had 
to be rooted in the local cultural context for it to 
be sustainable, and a thriving local culture was a 
goal, rather than just a means, of successful de-
velopment. In the 1990s, UNESCO built a broad 
coalition looking to reassert the coupling of cul-
ture and development in the face of the rapid 
spread of free trade agreements following on 
from GATT and the WTO. Cultural goods and 
services did have economic value, but they also 
possessed a cultural value which meant they 
could not be treated as pure commodity. The 
CDCE set the seal on the rights of states to enact 
legislation to protect its cultural goods and ser-
vices – the so called ‘cultural exception’ now 
reframed as crucial to global ‘diversity’. It did so 
in alliance with parties from the Global South 
who insisted on solidarity between North and 
South in the form of preferential treatment, artist 
mobility, the cultural diversity fund and so on.  
 
Ratification, however, coincided with the 
widespread embrace of claims about the econom-
ic value of culture and the benefits of trade liber-
alisation (cultural or otherwise) to Global North 
and South alike. At the strategic level UNESCO 
has remained ambivalent and nuanced, affirming 
                                                 
5 See the most recent report: 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2018d3_en.pdf. 
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the priority of cultural value, as in the joint 
UNDP/UNESCO 2013 Report, which disappoint-
ed many looking for a new round of statistical 
indicators6 . On the ground however UNESCO 
has increasingly adopted the terminology of crea-
tive economy and entrepreneurship in its opera-
tional and promotional literature, with pro-
grammes such as that for female creative entre-
preneurs in the ‘digital creative industries’7. Of 
course, though outside the CDCE, UNESCO’s 
cultural section has promoted the ‘Creative Cities 
Network’ since 2004 and has expanded rapidly 
across the globe.  
 
In this light the Creative Economy is the new 
normal, an often unquestioned background land-
scape to the contemporary cultural policy scene. 
Creativity, knowledge, innovation, disruption; 
start-ups, co-working spaces, creative hubs, en-
trepreneurship programmes; these are now a 
shared policy vernacular. They help articulate a 
global imaginary by which aspiring young peo-
ple in the Global South seeking to make a living 
in culture can grasp an image of transformation, 
of a viable future – for themselves, for their 
communities, for their nations even. They look to 
the kinds of creative economy programmes we 
sketched above as a sign of hope, and as such 
these aspirations need to be taken seriously and 
handled with care. But they also need to be scru-
tinised, because the creative economy agenda is 
not all it claims to be. It would be the collapse of 
this illusion, rather than anything I might say 
here, that threatens to turn utopian aspiration 
into anger and frustration. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Widening Local Development Pathways 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/pdf/creative-economy-report-
2013.pdf.  
7 https://en.unesco.org/creativity/news/unesco-sabrina-ho-
initiative-women-digital-creative.  
Beneath the Hype 
 
The claims about the Global South representing 
nearly half of the global trade in cultural goods 
looked different when China was taken out of the 
equation. China accounted for half of this trade, 
leaving the Global South with just over a fifth of 
total global trade in creative goods. When the 
rest of the BRICS were taken out, along with 
South Korea, we get a depressing picture. The 
share of the 49 Less Developed Countries in 
global creative goods exports was 0.11 per cent in 
2012, which, relative to its large share of the 
world’s population (880 million or some 12 per 
cent) is far from a success story (De Beukelaer: 
2014). When we look at what is classed as ‘cul-
tural goods’ we find the vast majority are manu-
factured goods of the kind China excels in pro-
ducing – furniture, glassware, ceramics, toys and 
so on. Not only does this undermine the idea of 
the creative economy as being about ‘intangibles’ 
but it also extends the notion of ‘creative indus-
tries’ into areas of mass manufacture not normal-
ly covered by a term designating a new economic 
epoch. Examining the charts showing China’s 
massive surplus and the US’s massive deficit in 
these areas, we can recognise this less as a story 
about the rise of the Global South and more 
about the complex synergies and substitutions 
between two global economic superpowers, or 
‘Chimerica’ as it was sometimes called8.  
 
Creative services  –  a term which covers digi-
tal content (including film and TV), copywrite, 
licensing and so on, where the ‘high value econ-
omy’ really resides  –  shows a familiar picture of 
the overwhelming domination by the Global 
North, with little sense that the new era will 
threaten this dominance any time soon. Certain-
ly, the subsequent growth in these sectors in Ko-
                                                 
8 See Chart 12 in the 2019 CEP Report. 
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rea and China has been impressive – China is by 
far the biggest exporter of cultural goods – but 
neither of these two can be considered ‘develop-
ing countries’ in any sensible taxonomy. And as 
we shall see, the industrial strategies which have 
been applied in these two countries are very dif-
ferent from that promoted by the creative econ-
omy paradigm. As far as it is possible to tell from 
the existing on-line UNCTAD statistics, whilst 
the growth rate in exports of creative goods from 
developing countries was 14 percent between 
2003-2015 as mentioned above, between 2012-
2015 growth declined to minus 1.92 percent9. In 
the 2019 CEP report the average growth in the 
export of cultural goods 2003-15 was revised 
down to 7.34 percent. The charts for cultural 
goods exports by region show a massive domina-
tion by Asia, with Africa, Oceana and South 
America barely registering10. ‘Transition’ econo-
mies barely register on any chart. The claims 
made by UNCTAD, and reproduced across a 
myriad consultancy reports, that the creative 
economy can generate foreign earnings for the 
Global South requires some serious scrutiny. 
And whatever the global economic value is gen-
erated it is distributed highly unequally between 
North and South, and between regions of the 
South – and between rural and urban areas, clas-
ses, genders and ethnicity.  
 
Challenges of the Global South 
 
The challenges faced in the Global South in this 
creative leap-frog are many and would have been 
all too familiar to all those involved in post-
colonial development. The first-mover ad-
vantages held by the incumbent powers in the 
                                                 
9 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx  
10 CER 2019 Report Chart 4. On Asia also see UNESCO and Ernst 
Young’s Cultural Times: The First Global Map of Cultural and Crea-
tive Industries. 
https://en.unesco.org/creativity/files/culturaltimesthefirstglobalm
apofculturalandcreativeindustries.pdf. 
global economy extends to the creative industries 
too. They control the corporations, the distribu-
tion and logistical networks, the intellectual 
property, the finance, the educational and cultur-
al capital and so on. The hopes for a flattening of 
global creative industries’ hierarchies as the in-
ternet 2.0 overturned the traditional gatekeepers 
underpinned much of the creative economy 
hype. It did not materialise. The new group of 
Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google 
(FAANG), have become globally dominant plat-
forms, ones that now reach into the local and the 
personal to an extent of which the old cultural 
industry corporations never dreamed.  
 
The roll-out of the knowledge economy came 
with a global tightening and extension of IP re-
gimes in ways that are increasingly well docu-
mented –and contested. Human creative talent is 
everywhere, but a career in the cultural indus-
tries requires levels of education and skills which 
challenge the educational resources of the Global 
South in all the ways we know. Challenging too 
is access to finance, and the ready availability of 
relatively wealthy consumers able to spend mon-
ey on these new industries. The problems of in-
frastructure – roads, venues, communications etc. 
– are well known, as is ‘governance’ and regula-
tion.  
 
These familiar barriers to development were 
not washed away by the global wave of creative 
economy. Which is not to say these are insupera-
ble, nor that they should not be challenged, nor 
that there are many success stories of the kind 
that appear in case studies boxes in reports and 
best practice panels at international conferences. 
But we do need to ask how this creative economy 
actually works. What kind of carrot is dangling at 
the end of its stick, and what changes does it 
require of us in order to keep chasing it? 
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Creative Entrepreneurs 
 
This question seems particularly apt for ‘creative 
entrepreneurship’, a consistent plank in all crea-
tive economy policy documents, as well as cen-
tral to the activities undertaken by cultural insti-
tutes, such as the British Council, the Goethe-
Institut or the Institut Français. Mapping docu-
ments, creative hubs, and entrepreneurship pro-
grammes seem well within the boundaries of 
feasible interventions. Much of the affective 
charge of the creative economy was its claim to 
open up spaces for younger, less established 
players, not dependent on state funding or a job 
with a corporate – especially so when neither of 
these were on offer. Stepping outside these 9-5 
jobs required some new business skills but most-
ly it asked for a new kind of self.  
 
Working in fluid project teams across net-
works rather than institutions, entrepreneurs 
were learning how to re-invent themselves in a 
more dynamic space ‘outside the box’ of a formal 
job, picking up new skills, and carving out new 
opportunities in a transformed creative field. The 
new creative subject was charged to combine the 
self-directed autonomy of the avant-garde artist 
with the ‘creative destruction’ of the Schumpet-
erian entrepreneur. This happened in a ‘creative 
milieu’, a semi-autonomous network embedded 
in particular urban places and through which 
new ideas emerge, circulate, mutate and acceler-
ate. It fosters an economy of small business or 
‘start-ups’, entities operating in a zone between 
the hierarchical, exclusive firm and looser social 
networks, between competition and collabora-
tion, between the market and ‘civil society’. This 
operates as a kind of ‘ecosystem’ neither amena-
ble to top-down state planning nor corporate 
control. The creative economy thus demanded 
new kinds of cities (or at least, zones therein) 
which encouraged creative milieus, new kinds of 
industrial organisation (small business ecosys-
tems), and new kinds of subjects able to autono-
mously create and innovate.  
 
This ‘creativity bundle’ is rarely spelled out in 
detail, yet it is a model of development drawn 
directly from the Global North and promoted as 
entirely apt for the Global South. Derived from a 
post-1989 Europe where a third way was sought 
between state directed and purely corporate 
economies, the new industrial policy focus on 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
benefitted an emergent cultural industries dis-
course. The idea of a locally embedded ecosys-
tem of cultural producers networked promised 
not only economic growth but a benign economy 
– good growth. Firms and entrepreneurs were 
rooted in place. They were (implicitly) more so-
cially responsive and resilient, and contributed 
‘positive externalities’ to the city, making it more 
liveable, more creative, further feeding the cul-
tural economy.  
 
This is precisely why, the argument went, a 
creative industries strategy was so beneficial to 
developing economies11. These positive externali-
ties provided the entrepreneurial skills and the 
socially embedded stock of knowledge, establish-
ing the mutual trust and confidence beneficial to 
endogenous development. This was not only the 
producers; for in order to properly promote, nur-
ture and expand the creative sector new kinds of 
policy, new forms of economic and cultural gov-
ernance would be required. This lay behind 
much of the zeal of the British Council, bringing 
economic growth and good government along 
with the benefits of culture. It forms part of the 
mission of UNESCO’s Expert Facility, who seek 
to change the cultural governance settings of the 
target countries (Global South) thus enabling 
                                                 
11 These arguments have been examined in detail by Andy Pratt 
(2015).  
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sustainable and equitable development in the 
field of culture.  
 
Much of this is laudable, and the reality of 
how it is on the ground, the transformations 
these interventions provoke are as many and 
varied as the people they touch. Most artists and 
creatives are pragmatic, willing to speak of crea-
tive entrepreneurship or whatever it takes, to 
open up resources to do the stuff they want to 
do. But I think something more than age-old 
pragmatic adaption is needed if we are to avoid 
yet another resource-extractive development 
model foisted on the Global South. The resources 
in question are indeed not raw materials and 
cheap labour, but the energies and aspirations of 
the youngest and brightest, as well as the lived 
cultures that have sustained them in the past, but 
which are now to be mined in the new global 
creative economy.  
 
The co-working spaces and the hubs, the net-
working and the start-ups all speak about new 
entrants and disruption, but the reality is very 
different. These milieus are in symbiotic relation-
ships with large investors (‘angels’ or otherwise) 
and large corporations; they provide the free 
R&D, the innovation feeder routes for these big 
players. Business model: create an app, build 
some presence, sell on to Google. This is not new. 
The traditional cultural industries already per-
fected the use of unpaid labour (screen-writing in 
the garret) in R&D, using scouting and A&R 
people to coral the talent towards the big players. 
This now may be more sophisticated than sign-
ing some unknown and naïve wannabee with a 
disastrous contract, but the ecosystem of a myri-
ad of small businesses (in a city like London 
something like 90 percent of creative businesses 
are under 50 people) organised around a smaller 
number of major players is still the norm. This 
should come as no surprise as the cultural indus-
tries are very much organised around a winner-
takes-all model. The well-known adage about the 
one hit financing the other nine misses also 
means that this one hit takes the profits from 
competing titles and the firms that produce them. 
Winner-takes-all. So too with creatives; those at 
the top are extremely well paid, but the vast ma-
jority can find it hard to get by. The dominant 
companies co-ordinate value chains that now 
stretch across the globe, with the higher value 
parts overwhelmingly located in the centre of the 
successful global cities.  Entrepreneurship in the 
creative economy does not break the domination 
of the Global North but forms an essential part of 
it.  
 
A New Epoch? 
 
For UNCTAD, the claims they make concern not 
just an expanding creative sector. For them this 
growth is harbinger of an epochal shift to a crea-
tive economy. The argumentation is pretty woe-
ful. Reading the reports leaves one no wiser as to 
what the creative economy actually is and if it is 
the same or different to the creative industries. 
The creative economy “is the knowledge-based 
economic activities upon which the ‘creative 
industries’ are based”. But the creative industries 
are also “the lifeblood of the creative economy”, 
the latter also “the sum of all the parts of the 
creative industries”. Inevitably UNCTAD uses 
the terms interchangeably, as do most of those 
who adopt it. “The creative economy has no sin-
gle definition. It is an evolving concept which 
builds on the interplay between human creativity 
and ideas and intellectual property, knowledge 
and technology”. Apart from a license to say just 
about whatever one wants about the concept, this 
takes an anthropological or civilisational sense of 
‘culture’ – as collective knowledge, or the general 
capacity of human creative ingenuity – and turns 
it into an economic resource. Just as ‘creativity’ 
becomes an “input” quite distinct from any val-
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ues traditionally associated with culture, creative 
economy inverts the traditional idea of economic 
development as part of a wider cultural or civili-
sational development. The latter now simply 
serves as resource for the former. The traditional 
role of culture of setting limits to, or offsetting 
the economic sphere, balancing it against wider 
ethical-political values, is displaced by its utilisa-
tion as resource for growth.  
 
This epochal shift to a creative economy was 
taken to mean that culture might now, finally, be 
taken seriously by powerful economic develop-
ment agencies. Yet it rests on a thin platform of 
historical evidence and a great bubble of over-
blown claims, generated by management gurus 
and creative consultants. That the cultural sector 
was tempted, in its search for ever-dwindling 
resources, to hitch itself to a wagon very few 
serious economic historians would countenance, 
is understandable. But selling the concept of cul-
ture for a handful of magic beans has come back 
to haunt it.  
 
It’s certainly bad economic history but it’s bad 
economic policy too. Apart from the definitional 
confusion, which speaks to a much deeper set of 
category errors, the creative economy discourse 
pays little attention to how the cultural industry 
actually works and what policy settings would 
be required to develop it. To see this one should 
look at South Korea or China. Though both have 
adopted ‘creative industries’ from time to time, 
both are concerned with ‘culture’ as ‘content’. 
Instead of chasing the ineffable enigma that is the 
creative economy, their policies focus on the cul-
tural industries, defined in a workable manner as 
those activities which generate economic value 
through symbolic content. They use the standard 
list of film, TV and Radio, printing, recorded 
music, performing arts, video games, visual arts, 
fashion, crafts and so on – ‘content industries’. 
Both governments use resources evolved from 
their ‘developmental state’ repertoire  –  the 
state-led model of development which was out-
lawed by the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 
1980s and 1990s. Both countries applied their 
state developmental capacity to the cultural in-
dustries  –  one filtered through a newly minted 
parliamentary democracy, the other through 
‘socialism with Chinese characteristic’. They do 
not use the creativity bundle but seek a real in-
dustrial strategy focusing on supply chains, mer-
gers, regulations, targets, high finance, export 
licenses, infrastructure, trade deals, foreign in-
vestment and so on. I am not holding this up as a 
model of cultural policy. Reverting to the word 
‘cultural’ rather than ‘creative’ did not stop it 
being used in a highly instrumental fashion, their 
goals distributed between generating import 
revenue and country branding or ‘soft power’. 
But it is an industrial policy, and one significant-
ly at odds with the ‘creativity bundle’ promoted 
by the Creative Economy12.  
 
Here we should recall the failure of the last 
concerted attempt to challenge the dominance of 
the Global North, under the frame of the New 
World Information and Communication Order 
(NWICO), in which UNESCO, through the 
McBride Commission, was heavily invested. The 
defeat of the NWICO (and the decade-long mar-
ginalisation of UNESCO) coincided with a mas-
sive expansion of the global communications 
infrastructure – satellites, fibre-optics, telecoms, 
logistical protocols and so on – and the global de-
regulation of state-run broadcasting and com-
munications sectors. This allowed telecoms and 
content providers in the Global North to engage 
in a process of convergence whilst simultaneous-
ly moving into the deregulated communications 
space of the Global South. The Creative Economy 
model accepts, rather than challenges, the exist-
                                                 
12 On Korea see Lee (2018). Also her comparison with the UK’s 
policy settings Lee (2019). On China see Rong/O’Connor (2018).  
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ing configuration of infrastructure and owner-
ship stemming from the global ‘re-regulation’ of 
the 1980s and 1990s. The Creative Economy is not 
a new epochal shift but a flexible cultural policy 
app that sits on this global information and 
communications platform. 
 
China has the power to challenge these con-
figurations; South Korea the economic clout to 
make them work for their content industries. 
Most countries in the Global South do not have 
the resources, individually, to engage in such 
ambitious industry strategies. But by now the 
very idea of such a strategy has been de-
legitimised – both individually and collectively – 
as the only viable path proffered to the Global 
South is to Be Creative! 
 
Clean, Weightless and Renewable? 
 
The appeal of the Creative Economy stemmed in 
no large part from its seemingly easy availability 
to any country willing to change the old ways 
and seize a creative future. UNCTAD proclaimed 
the creative economy as one of ‘intangibles’, end-
lessly renewable and ubiquitously available. This 
linked the creative economy to the agenda of 
sustainability in a double sense. It meant invest-
ing in creative talent, making sure the new gen-
erations of creative entrepreneurs were coming 
through; but essentially, human talent was the 
perfect renewable, abundant and cheap. And it 
was also clean. Creativity did not scar the land-
scape or pollute the rivers, quite the contrary; it 
made the country glitter and shine. Unfortunate-
ly, it is no longer possible to see the creative in-
dustries in this way. They rely on a whole range 
of sophisticated electronic machines and compo-
nents, most of which are made in East Asia and 
the US, and which are heavily extractive. No 
copper, no digital. The resources used in making 
and consuming cultural products, including the 
massive carbon footprint of the global internet 
and communications systems, and the global 
transportation system this facilitates is enormous. 
A recent report shows on-line music streaming to 
have a bigger carbon footprint than vinyl.13 The 
impact of e-waste is only now becoming clear. 
And we have seen how the increase in the global 
trade in cultural goods is predominantly about 
manufacturing, which, as we know with regards 
to fashion, is highly resource intensive (on this 
see Maxwell/Miller 2012).  
 
Beyond these real ecological impacts, the very 
idea of an endlessly renewable resource – human 
creativity – is also the story of a never satisfied 
consumer. The symbiosis between the creative 
economy and the resource intensive consumer 
economy is both real and symbolic. The re-
sources used up by the creative industry is mir-
rored in the image of the consumer society it 
celebrates. The key principle of the cultural in-
dustries as a new source of economic growth, 
coming after the failure of Fordism and mass 
consumption, was of ‘post-material’ or ‘experi-
ence’ goods. One could have enough fridges and 
cars, but the demand for cultural products is 
infinite. The emphasis on discretionary ‘position-
al’ or ‘aspirational’ consumption as central to 
growth positioned the middle class as the key 
driver of development. Whereas in the past it 
was the industrial working class, or a commer-
cially active peasantry that provided the index of 
development, now it was the growing ‘urban 
middle class’. The urban creative entrepreneur 
can be seen as the youthful counterpart of the 
urban middle-class consumer, driving the carbon 
footprints in the cities in the south as in those of 
the north. Are we to see the ‘creative class’, such 
as it is, as the avant-garde of the urban middle 
class, just as lawyers, doctors and journalists 
                                                 
13 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/mar/12/uk-
music-industry-carbon-footprint. 
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were in the heady days of the 19th century bour-
geoisie? 
 
The Creative Economy Imaginary 
 
Of course, most are simply seeking to make a 
living and contribute to the broader development 
of the communities in which they work. I do not 
suggest that all programmes rolled out under the 
banner of the creative economy are useless or 
damaging. Whatever is written on the outside of 
these programmes, on the inside they are fre-
quently about art, culture and community devel-
opment. Promoting good governance also means 
promoting gender and ethnic equality, sexual 
diversity, artistic freedom, and building support-
ive, safe and inclusive places to do good cultural 
work. The skills and confidence acquired in crea-
tive entrepreneurship programmes can be very 
useful in building careers, and they can be ‘retro-
fitted’ to focus on ‘social entrepreneurship’ and 
community ‘leadership’.  
 
But none of these benefits, individual or 
communal, really require a creative economy 
framework. Established culture and development 
programmes long sought these kinds of out-
comes and continue to do so. These interventions 
often built on the ‘capabilities’ framework associ-
ated with the economist Amatya Sen and the 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum. So too does the 
United Nations’ strong push, since 2009, on ‘cul-
tural rights’, taken directly from the 1948 Decla-
ration of Human Rights, Article 27, in which 
discourses of full participative political, social 
and economic citizenship are extended directly to 
culture. UNESCO’s CDCE has increasingly fo-
cused on artist rights and mobility, gender equal-
ity and ‘fundamental freedoms’. And more tradi-
tional development programmes for education, 
social welfare and access to housing, or the basic 
material rights claimed in the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals, can all provide a justification for 
intervention in the cultural sphere. So perhaps 
the creative entrepreneurship programmes are 
just one more resource which can be used to ‘do 
culture’.  
 
But I think it is more problematic than this. 
Youthful creative energies are now embodied in 
a role model whose ultimate purpose – whatever 
the social policy retrofitting – is to succeed in 
business by becoming an ‘entrepreneur of the 
self’14. Learning, contacts and experience be-
comes capital investment in the self, manifested 
in a constant process of self-branding. The crea-
tive entrepreneur works within collaborative-
competitive networks which can just as easily cut 
against collective solidarity as work for it, as can 
be seen in low rates of union participation in 
these industries. The emphasis on the entrepre-
neurial self puts the risks of success and failure 
squarely back on the shoulders of the individual, 
when as we have seen, in large parts this is down 
to contingent and external factors. Anxiety and 
competitiveness, ‘always on’ lifestyles and an 
enforced career-driven performative narcissism 
are perils to be set alongside low wages and pre-
carious employment. 
 
The creative economy and its entrepreneurial 
tropes are part of an ‘imaginary’ whose impact 
on everyday language and understanding we 
should not ignore. Entrepreneurship often pre-
sents itself as encouraging people to take respon-
sibility in a way that ignores the histories of so-
cial and political activism in the Global South, 
and the organisational abilities and energies on 
which this draws. The market, not politics or the 
state, is the way forward, it seems. Most creatives 
do not see the world like this, but they can find it 
                                                 
14 The phrase is Foucault’s. See the discussion in Angela 
McRobbie’s (2016) Be Creative: Making a Living in the New Culture 
Industries. Polity Press. 
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very difficult when they have bought into the 
discourse of the creative economy and the in-
strumentalisation of culture it entails. Policy 
makers have embraced this new creative econo-
my and it is increasing hard to assert a contrary 
view: that the job of culture is not to create jobs, 
even though it does create jobs; that the job of 
culture is to commemorate, to entertain, to pre-
serve, to celebrate, to differentiate ourselves and 
to bring us together. This is all so easily reduced 
to a new advanced services and high-end con-
sumer economy whose job is to deliver whatever 
is required to the consumer with maximum effi-
ciency, the actual content of this being a concern 
solely for her and her credit card provider. 
 
Political Economy of Culture 
 
Somebody once asked me, as I was making this 
kind of argument: is your rejection of the creative 
economy not based on privilege? A serious ques-
tion, to which the answer is ‘yes’, if such an ar-
gument simply reverts to some idealist notion of 
culture, a pure appearance detached from the 
labour and the resources that went into its mak-
ing. We do need a political economy of culture. 
The increasing emphasis on cultural rights is 
welcome, but, as the jurist and historian Samuel 
Moyn warns us, human rights are not enough 
(Moyn 2018). We need to create the material re-
sources and the equitable access to these that can 
only be secured by governments. This includes 
any reversal of the on-going transfer of wealth 
from the South to the North, and the political 
coalitions that would be required to affect this.  
 
Conferences on cultural policy makers tend, 
quite understandably, to focus on art and culture, 
and what it can do for us. This often leaves the 
issue of the material nitty-gritty to the creative 
economy; but this hands over the questions of 
economy to the economists, a serious mistake. A 
real political economy of culture challenges clas-
sical or neo-liberal economics as scientific or 
‘natural’: economics brings into being that which 
it purports only to describe, in a highly political 
process which it constantly disavows. A political 
economy of culture understands the material 
basis of the production and consumption of cul-
ture, but also how these do, or do not, serve the 
uses we seek from culture. It does not dismiss the 
economy, as the efficient allocation of resources, 
but makes it serve society, not the other way 
around. 
 
The breakup of the neo-liberal orthodoxy is 
now commonly recognised, though least of all 
perhaps in the cultural sector. There has been 
multiple questioning of the benefits of globalisa-
tion and the equity of market-led development – 
often from their erstwhile defenders such as US 
economists Paul Krugman and Joseph Steiglitz. 
This has given rise to a widespread sense of diso-
rientation and anxiety, some of which has mani-
fested as authoritarian and exclusionary nativ-
ism. But the ‘age of anger’ also spread to a range 
of ‘losers’ some of who are the cultural workers 
themselves, feeling cheated by the failure of the 
promise of cosmopolitan globalisation and its 
creative futures (see Mishra 2017).  
 
But there is a burgeoning critique of growth 
itself, fed by the fear of an impending ecological 
catastrophe, a wall towards which the global 
economy is hurtling. Questioning orthodox eco-
nomic settings finally reaches growth itself – the 
endless imperative to expand, to increase profits 
whatever the external costs. Creativity, in its post 
Renaissance Euro-centric iteration, has been part 
of this growth imperative. Creation ex nihilo has 
Faustian overtones resonant with a global capi-
talism in which endless growth at the expense of 
nature is a central defining feature of human 
endeavour. It is for this reason we look to non-
western traditions, alternative possibilities for 
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modernity, which look to preservation, custodi-
anship, living with boundaries, balance -- not 
constant unthinking change. A new political 
economy of culture would not only foreground 
the values of culture but how our culture stands 
in relation to a planet under severe distress. 
 
Here indigenous voices are making them-
selves felt, and we need to hear more of them. In 
Latin America around bem viver, amongst peas-
ants fighting deforestation in Asia, in indigenous 
Australia. But also from cultural workers and 
artists in the cities of the Global South, looking to 
projects around sustainability, building local 
supply chains, breaking the cycles of gentrifica-
tion and urban consumerism. And also preserv-
ing the cultural resources, of tradition and com-
munity. 
 
The re-launch of the Creative Economy Pro-
gramme comes in very different circumstances to 
that of 2004, or the later reports. There is now 
geo-political uncertainty and a collapse of the 
post 1989 Washington Consensus, even, perhaps, 
an unravelling of the post-1945 settlement. But 
more importantly the imaginaries of the future, 
where they are not bleak or exclusionary, are of a 
world that seeks out different ways of living on 
the planet and with each other. The creative 
economy no longer speaks to this future, and we 
need another language. 
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